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Subverting Institutions: 
Derrida and Zhuangzi on the Power of Institutions 
_________________________________________ 
 
STEVEN BURIK 
Singapore Management University, Singapore (stevenburik@smu.edu.sg) 
 
This paper shows how both Jacques Derrida and Zhuangzi use their respective ways of subverting 
philosophical systems, by and large through language systems, to arrive at an (implicit or explicit) 
subversion of political power or political systems or institutions. Political institutions are presented as 
including more general institutions such as the media, press, and academic and other kinds of institutions 
that influence the way our societies function, the way we live, work, and think. The paper first highlights 
the similarities and differences in the application of subversive techniques in Derrida and Zhuangzi as they 
battle against their respective opponents. After that it shows how their subversion of philosophical systems 
and language flows over into the subversion of political systems. The hope or goal of subversion or critique is 
often understood to be not only overthrowing the old system, but replacing it with a better one, even when the 
change or overthrow comes from within the system itself. But this paper aims to show that both Derrida 
and Zhuangzi, although in very different contexts, also seem to subvert that hope, and that they may or 
may not offer some kind of way out of this conundrum. 
 
Key words: subversion; Jacques Derrida; Daoism; Zhuangzi; comparative philosophy; 
continental philosophy 
 
 
In this paper I will seek to show how both Jacques Derrida and Zhuangzi use their respective 
ways of subverting philosophical systems, by and large through language systems, to arrive at an 
(implicit or explicit) subversion of political power or political systems or institutions. Here I will 
understand political institutions to include institutions in general such as the media, press, and 
academic and other kinds of institutions that influence the way our societies function, the way 
we live, work, and think. I will argue that neither Derrida nor Zhuangzi think of institutions 
purely descriptively in terms of affecting our thinking. They do see institutions as inevitable to 
thinking, and their first and immediate efforts are geared towards making their readers aware of 
how this plays out. But in a second move, both Derrida and Zhuangzi, with the help of their first 
efforts, aim to reduce our dependence on certain oppressive or dominant institutions or 
structures that have a tendency to suppress other ways of thought. Hence both Derrida and 
Zhuangzi believe that it is the case that (certain) institutions do not just affect our ways of 
thought by necessity, but further seek to convince us of the danger that some structures or 
institutions tend to be obstacles to thought, or at the very least tend to block out other ways of 
thinking.  
 In sections 1 to 4 I will highlight the similarities and differences in the application of 
subversive techniques in Derrida and Zhuangzi as they battle against their respective opponents. 
After that, I will show in section 5 how their subversion of philosophical systems and language 
flows over into the subversion of political systems, before delving deeper into the Zhuangzi in 
section 6. But before this there needs to be one warning: the definition of subversion that 
follows does not seem to include this, but the hope or goal of subversion or critique is often 
understood to be not only to overthrow the old system, but also to replace it with a better one, 
even when the change or overthrow comes from within the system itself. However, I hope to 
show, throughout the paper but especially in section 7, that both Derrida and Zhuangzi, 
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although in very different contexts, also seem to subvert that hope, and that they may or may not 
offer some kind of way out of this conundrum. 
 Before I start on Derrida and Zhuangzi, here is that promised definition of subversion. 
Combining some sources,1 we can come to the following working definition: subversion is the act 
of trying to destroy or damage an established system or government, often from within that system. My paper 
attempts to reflect a certain unease or undecidability inherent in the concept of subversion. This 
is because I am going to argue that the idea of subversion points to the exceeding or overthrow 
of systems or structures, and when structures are shown to have limitations and to be unable to 
cope adequately with novelty, people become uneasy. I am thinking here of course of Jacques 
Derrida, and the names often used for his kind of work: post-structuralism or de-construction. 
Similarly, Zhuangzi often leaves us with the unease of not having reached a proper solution or 
answer. To reflect this unease in or with subversion, my paper will be deliberately less structured.  
 Of course, the title of this paper, “Subverting Institutions,” can be read in two ways: 
First in the sense that institutions are subverting our ways of thinking, which may lead into a 
discussion about how we are affected by institutions and the influence of social media, or 
capitalism, or about how we create meaning and systems of language. Institutions can direct our 
thinking in multiple ways, but this in itself is not a reason to subvert such systems, or to call 
them subverting. But we can call them subverting if we realize that by directing our thinking in 
one way, they effectively block out other ways of thinking. Comparative philosophy has of 
course been at the forefront of the efforts to change this in the discipline of philosophy itself, 
and it is in this spirit that I offer my arguments here. This is because the second way the title of 
this article can be read is in the sense that we are or should be subverting those very institutions, 
exactly because they represent obstacles to thinking and/or living well. I will argue that Derrida 
and Zhuangzi both urge us to do what the second reading suggests once we understand that the 
first reading is really an inherent feature of institutionalization and is thus present in influential 
ways all around us. 
 
 
1 Comparisons of Derrida and Zhuangzi and  
           Subversion in Continental Philosophy 
 
There is a growing body of literature comparing Derrida and Zhuangzi. From the early article by 
Michelle Yeh and the works of Hongchu Fu and Zhang Longxi in the 1980s and early 90s,2 the 
last twenty years or so have seen an abundance of new work appear that compares Derrida and 
Daoism. Some of those works deal specifically with comparing Derrida with Zhuangzi, like 
Robert Shepherd’s “Perpetual Unease of Being at Ease”3 or Youru Wang’s “Philosophy of 
Change and the Deconstruction of Self in the Zhuangzi.”4 Although this may not do justice to the 
diversity and depth of the works quoted and to other works comparing Derrida and Zhuangzi, it 
is fair to say that the most common feature of such comparisons lies in the commonalities 
between their analyses of language and its functions, with regards to ideas of identity and 
subjectivity/self, and in the deconstructive approaches to ideas of morality and purity, and lastly 
in their shared opposition to hierarchical thought structures. Some articles make the extra move 
of claiming that where Derrida does not offer a clear solution to the problems he addresses, 
Zhuangzi has somehow found a way out. Mark Berkson for example argues this way in his 
“Language: the Guest of Reality—Zhuangzi and Derrida on Language, Reality, and 
Skillfulness.”5Although such commonalities seem to—by definition—deal indirectly with issues 
related to subversion, none of these comparative works deals with subversion directly. Of course, 
many articles on Derrida do engage with subversion, and some of them will be quoted in what 
follows to help us better understand the specific ways in which Derrida “subverts.”  
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 My contribution here focuses on comparing Derrida and Zhuangzi specifically on the 
idea of subversion for two reasons. First, I believe that through understanding the similarities in 
the use of the idea of subversion in Derrida and Zhuangzi, we can come to a better 
understanding of their respective works, and as a result, the commonalities mentioned will be 
focused into what I think is one of their major concerns. Second, through the works of both 
Derrida and Zhuangzi it seems that we will gain a better understanding of the very idea of 
subversion itself, and with that, I hope to lessen the negative connotations associated with this 
concept, and even claim that in a new understanding, subversion may describe the very function 
of philosophy proper. 
 Before I start the comparison, I must briefly delineate the history of the subversive in 
continental philosophy, because it is in this tradition that Derrida develops his ideas on 
subversion and its function. Thinking back to the definition of subversion offered above, one 
could say that the history of continental philosophy from Hegel onwards is one of multiple 
attempts at overthrowing systems of thought. Starting with Hegel’s idea of the dialectic process 
of thesis, anti-thesis, and synthesis, and of course cognizant of the fact that Hegel saw his own 
thinking as system-building rather than system-destroying, his was still an attempt to describe the 
oppositional structure of thought, and of the ways thinking seeks to overthrow itself to come to 
a new and improved position. In Nietzsche’s Umwertung aller Werte we find a clear example of the 
subversive strategies continental philosophy has employed. Nietzsche actively seeks to invert and 
subvert the system of morality and metaphysics, but we also find here that part of subversion 
that is missing in our definition. Nietzsche is not content merely to replace the supersensuous 
world with the sensuous one. With Nietzsche, the recognition surfaces that such overthrowing 
of systems remains parasitic to those systems themselves. He is not for nothing the author of 
“Beyond Good and Evil” and not the author of “Replacing Good with Evil.” This is also 
apparent in the fact that Nietzsche himself conceived of a further step after the inversion. As 
quoted in Heidegger’s Nietzsche volume: “Along with the true world we have also abolished the 
apparent one!” (Nietzsche in Heidegger 1979-1987: 207).6 This indicates that Nietzsche was 
aware of the fact that mere reversal was not enough, but unfortunately (at least according to 
Heidegger), the onslaught of his madness prevented him from actively taking that last step in his 
works. As Heidegger says of Nietzsche’s inversion of Platonism, which seeks to establish the 
sensuous as the true instead of the supersensuous: “It is not the simple, almost mechanical 
exchange of one epistemological standpoint for another […] the inversion sanctions the 
investigation and determination of that which is—it summons the question ‘What is being itself?’” 
(Heidegger 1979-1987: 160). And further, “such inversion […] must be understood in terms of 
the overcoming of nihilism” (Heidegger 1979-1987: 161). In Heidegger’s words, commenting on 
the inversion, understood purely as the switching places in the hierarchy of the supersensuous 
and the sensuous: “If we take the inversion strictly in this sense, then the vacant niches of the 
‘above and below’ are preserved […]. But as long as the ‘above and below’ define the formal 
structure of Platonism, Platonism in its essence perdures” (Heidegger 1979-1987: 201). 
Heidegger, through his work on Nietzsche, but also in his work in general, was maybe the first to 
fully develop this idea that subversion, if understood as mere reversal or inversion, is inadequate 
and parasitic. It is not enough to invert the hierarchy, it is the hierarchy of the system itself that 
needs to be challenged. For Heidegger, the act of reversal is only a necessary step in thinking, as 
he continues the struggle against a dominant metaphysical way of thinking that has defined the 
history of western philosophy.  
 But Heidegger realizes another important thing: that no matter how hard one tries to not 
just reverse the hierarchy of a system, but to escape that system altogether, this is ultimately 
altogether impossible. Heidegger realizes that time and again, one is dependent on the tools of 
history, the language of philosophy, in one’s efforts to escape philosophy as metaphysics of 
presence. Thus, in Heidegger the idea of subversion becomes a continuously necessary step. One 
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cannot climb the ladder and throw it away in self-congratulatory fashion, now believing one has 
successfully scaled the wall. One needs to continually climb all those ladders that keep 
resurfacing. 
 From this brief and inevitably incomplete discussion, I wish only to conclude the 
following: the development of the idea of differential thought in continental philosophy from 
Hegel to Heidegger shows that their intention is never a mere reversal or an inversion of 
opposites; it is always something more or different than that. Order is not to be merely replaced 
by another order, or even by disorder, because this will keep the hierarchical structures intact. It 
is the hierarchical structures perpetuated in certain ways of thought (metaphysics of presence) 
that must themselves be challenged, in the awareness that even such challenges will never fully 
succeed in overcoming or escaping from such systems. It is in this tradition in continental 
philosophy of understanding subversion that Derrida works. 
 
 
2 Deconstruction as Subversion, with a Hint to Zhuangzi 
 
My first claim with regards to Derrida is that deconstruction and subversion are to a large extent 
the same. I do not think this is very controversial. Any opponent of deconstruction would 
readily subscribe to this interpretation, and proponents happily do the same. Deconstruction, like 
subversion, is an opening up to destabilization of the status quo and to the undecidable. 
Deconstruction subverts the stability of the dominant discourse, the dominant narrative, or the 
“correct” interpretation. In that sense deconstruction is a challenge to the idea that we could 
accurately know “the” meaning of anything. It is important to understand that deconstruction 
does not hereby deny meaning, but compromises and complicates the idea that meaning can 
always be assigned clearly and distinctly. Deconstruction achieves this by showing inconsistencies, 
by pointing to problematic presuppositions, or just to assumptions that were hidden in the 
process of generating meaning.  
 Derrida deconstructs and thereby subverts systems like metaphysics, language, political 
structures, conceptuality, seemingly clear oppositions, the drawing of sharp boundaries, in short, 
almost everything philosophy seems to hold dear. In fact, Derrida himself said that the idea of 
différance “instigates the subversion of every kingdom. Which makes it obviously threatening and 
infallibly dreaded by everything within us that desires a kingdom […]” (Derrida 1982: 22).7 Not 
incidentally, a few lines earlier Derrida mentions that différance is meant to solicit “in the sense 
that solicitare, in old Latin, means to shake as a whole, to make tremble in entirety” (Derrida 1982: 
21). This, I will argue, is similar to the concerns that Zhuangzi seems to have. The dangers both 
Derrida and Zhuangzi fight against, in their of course vastly different settings, are those of 
ossification, reification, the ideals of purity, clarity, and literality, and by extension the fixation of 
political and moral ideals. Derrida seems to suggest that the real task of philosophy (and of 
course we know that through deconstruction the notion of “real” is already problematic) should 
actually be this form of deconstructive thinking whereby “philosophy is always called upon to 
transgress the border of regions of research or knowledge and to ask itself about its own limits 
[…]. Philosophy is always in the process of displacing its limits” (Derrida 1995: 376).8 In this 
sense, philosophy is subversion. 
 Both Derrida and Zhuangzi seem to question, critique, and subvert almost anything. But 
there are in both of them certain things that are beyond critique; both Derrida and Zhuangzi do 
indeed recognize certain limits. Zhuangzi for example does not question the filial bonds between 
parent and child, and more interestingly in the context of this paper, he also does not seem to 
question the hierarchy between subject and ruler (of which more later). On the other hand, 
Derrida has claimed that “Justice in itself, if such a thing exists, outside or beyond law, is not 
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deconstructible. No more than deconstruction itself, if such a thing exists. Deconstruction is 
justice” (Derrida in Carlson et al. 1992: 14-5).9  
 One question we may legitimately ask is: Why should we not subvert these things? Or 
alternatively, should we be worried about not deconstructing them? What will future generations 
think when we do not deconstruct or try to subvert the justness of “democracy” for example? 
Does Derrida not himself ask: “Does not a democrat have the responsibility to think through the 
axioms or foundations of democracy?” (Derrida 1992: 95).10 Here one needs to understand the 
importance of systems, structures, and institutions. Derrida already hints at the fact that justice is 
“outside or beyond” the law. One then begins to understand that those things that are outside of 
systems, institutions, and structures are the ones that are probably non-deconstructible. In the 
language of Zhuangzi, such moments of non-critique or non-subversions are recognized as being 
“beyond the guidelines” (Zhuangzi, Graham 2001: 89).11 So what is non-deconstructible are such 
things that could be considered non-artificial structures, and as such not open to subversion or 
deconstruction. By extension, those who roam on or beyond the guidelines would be the “real” 
philosophers, questioning and subverting anything that falls within the guidelines or systems that 
we have invented. In both Zhuangzi and Derrida we find the idea that such systems, since they 
are in the end man-made, should always be open to questioning and change. 
 Although they do not subvert everything, what is common to them is that both Derrida 
and Zhuangzi subvert dreams of authenticity, certainty, purity, and clarity. Especially to their 
opponents (but I like to think they both enjoy this image), they are indecipherable, muddled, 
indirect, and deny the possibility of final answers. I do not believe they enjoy this for the sake of 
being obscure, though; instead, in their writings, and this includes their styles of writing, they 
urge us to embrace complexity, to abide in the aporias and paradoxes, and to halt the futile 
search for purity, complete clarity, and transparency. They subvert what most people take for 
granted, i.e., that there must be clear and univocal answers.  
 Because of this, both Derrida and Zhuangzi have been accused of not being “real” 
philosophers, and this is exactly because they question or subvert the standard rules of 
engagement of their respective intellectual discourses; they question whether those discourses are 
complete and exhaustive, or whether they are not rather one-sided and incomplete, and thereby 
oppressive because of the tendency of those dominant discourses to see themselves as providing 
the answer, of being right. An example of this can be found in the well-documented treatment of 
Derrida in what has become known as the “Cambridge affair.”12 And Zhuangzi’s emphasis on 
uselessness has of course been used against him to claim he is indeed useless to philosophy. 
Again, I would venture that both Derrida and Zhuangzi would be (at least to a certain extent) 
quite happy to be placed outside of what is the standard of philosophy. Most of all, what Derrida 
seeks to subvert is the dogmatic approach to philosophy that would define what philosophy is 
once and for all, a narrow technical way of thought properly institutionalized and, as comparative 
philosophers are all too aware, not very prone to change. But for Derrida, the most important 
thing is to question and subvert this dominant approach, and this is important, not necessarily 
because the dominant approach may be wrong, but more because as dominant it will tend to shut 
out other approaches. As such, Derrida’s work is a  
 
re-examination of the fundamental norms and premises of a number of dominant 
discourses, the principles underlying many of their evaluations, the structures of 
academic institutions, and the research that goes on within them. What this questioning 
does is modify the rules of the dominant discourse […] (Derrida 1995: 409-10).13  
 
Again, the point is to modify, not to deny such discourses their place. 
 Deconstruction then is a challenge to and critique of certain structures and institutions 
and their propensity to impose themselves on our thinking, but at the same time deconstruction 
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is an affirmation of the necessity of thinking and of exposing these structures. So in what 
follows, we have to think of institutions in a wider sense here, starting with the institutions of 
philosophy and language. Both Derrida and Zhuangzi will show, although in different ways, that 
these are artificial structures arbitrarily narrowed down, but they nevertheless influence how we 
“ought” to think. As such, all of these institutionalizations need to be questioned, deconstructed, 
and subverted. And such is the proper task of philosophy. 
 Yet, as we have just seen, such critical questioning does not, either in Derrida or 
Zhuangzi, amount to a simple denial of certain concepts, principles, and systems; it is more a 
question of complicating what is taken for granted, indicating what has been overlooked in 
establishing identities, and by doing so, pointing to the impossibility of closure or subsumption 
to fixed standards. Following on from Heidegger, Derrida understands that deconstruction must 
challenge hierarchy not in order to completely do away with it, but in order to transform our 
understanding of it:  
 
What must occur then is not merely a suppression of all hierarchy, for anarchy only 
consolidates just as surely the established order of a metaphysical hierarchy; nor is it a 
simple change or reversal in the terms of any given hierarchy. Rather the Umdrehung must 
be a transformation of the hierarchical structure itself (Derrida 1979: 81, German in 
original).14 
 
Why does this need to be done? Because Derrida at least believes, but I think this would hold for 
Zhuangzi as well, that the only way systems can be prevented from their deadly tendency to stifle 
opposition, close themselves off, and fossilize is to relentlessly question them. Only such a 
continuous interrogation can provide for openness. And that means that even a system that is 
generally or consensually considered correct, like democracy for example, can only benefit from 
being questioned and critiqued.  
 Such questioning, I would venture, is necessary to or should be at least an integral part of 
our edification, a necessity for improvement. There is really nothing new in this. Any thought 
system that closes itself off to criticism is bound to lose its openness and vitality. 
Deconstructions for Derrida provide this opening “by bending [the] rules with respect for the 
rules themselves in order to allow the other to come or to announce its coming in the opening of 
this dehiscence” (Derrida 2007: 59-60).15 It is instructive to pause at this word “dehiscence” for a 
moment. The Oxford English Dictionary lists “dehiscence” as “gaping, opening by divergence of 
parts”16 and states that the term is mostly used in plant life—for example, in the blossoming of 
and opening of the flower. For Derrida however, the picture is a bit less romantic and a bit more 
violent. Dehiscence represents not the gentle natural opening of the flower, but more the 
forceful wedging open of what has closed in on itself, the space revealed by forcefully opening 
up our rigid thought structures, by deconstructing what is supposedly an identity. Geoffrey 
Bennington has summed this up well by saying that in Derrida’s work “[t]he point […] is not to 
reintegrate remains into philosophy, but […] to introduce a radical nondialectisable alterity into 
the heart of the same” (Bennington, and Derrida 1993: 291).17  The point of critique, of 
questioning, and indeed of subversion then may not be to come to a synthesis dialectically, not 
to dialectically move to a better or higher position, but as I will argue, to rest in the knowledge of 
the impossibility of such a dialectical maneuver, without having that knowledge cripple our 
thinking. There are really two positions possible here, and I believe something can be said for 
both positions: the position of having subversion as a necessary stage in getting to something 
better, and the position of recognizing that this hope or move to something better is always itself 
frustrated or subverted. I will argue that the second position is closer to Derrida, and although 
one normally understands Zhuangzi to be advocating the first position, I think he can be seen as 
actually advocating the second one. 
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 Now it is in this context that Derrida argues that philosophy cannot be separated from 
its institutions, which are the university, schools, disciplines, media and publishing industries, and 
most importantly, language.18 According to Derrida, since there is no neutral or universal 
language, any natural language in which philosophy is practiced should also be seen as an 
institution of philosophy. This shows that philosophy cannot be the universal discipline of pure 
reason it has so often presented itself to be, but that institutions of philosophy (including and 
foremost language) are a major influence on the content, meaning, and practice of philosophies, 
and not just in their distribution.  
 While constantly questioning philosophy in these various ways, deconstruction also 
affirms philosophy and defends it against “anything that might come along to threaten this 
integrity, dissolve, dissect, or disperse the identity of the philosophical as such” (Derrida 2004: 
170).19 I have added this comment to counter the common conception that Derrida’s thinking is 
just a simple destruction of the metaphysical, logocentric tradition without anything to offer in 
its place. Instead I will show that his attacks function in multiple ways. Thus in what follows I 
will speak, in keeping with Derrida’s terminology, of a double bind, which I will explain as both a 
defense of philosophical thinking and at the same time an attack on mainstream philosophy, 
which can only be done using the language of the dominant discourse while also challenging it. 
 To reiterate, the main force of Derrida’s work is the call to open up philosophy and its 
education and dissemination to what is usually considered to be outside of it (like the media, 
press, and universities). As he says: “We stand opposed to whatever would prohibit philosophy 
from [….] opening itself up to new objects in a way that knows no limit of principle, from 
recalling that it was already present there where no one wanted to acknowledge it” (Derrida 2004: 
170). Such a force of prohibition could take many forms and is not just limited to state power or 
other legal prohibitions, but ranges from educational aspects such as lack of support for research, 
to media and publishing industries, to philosophers themselves who oppose any widening of or 
incursion into the strictly philosophical by something they see as being “outside.” In short, such 
prohibitions arise largely through “institutionalization.” I will now discuss what Derrida 
considers the most important of these institutions, language and the university. 
 
 
3 Language as the Institution of Philosophy 
 
As briefly mentioned, the first and foremost institution of philosophy is language, which 
influences how we do philosophy in important ways. According to Derrida, any dominant 
discourse  
 
tends to impose a model of language that is supposedly favourable to this 
communication. Claiming to speak in the name of intelligibility, good sense, common 
sense, or the democratic ethic, this discourse tends, by means of these very things, and if 
as naturally, to discredit anything that complicates this model (Derrida 1992: 55).  
 
The most famous instance of this according to Derrida is the preference given in western 
philosophy to the voice, the spoken word, which is valued for its presence and thereby for its 
conveying actual meaning, versus the written word, which is seen as inferior since it at best 
indirectly represents presence, but is more likely to distort meaning. I will not rehearse all the 
arguments Derrida has to critique this hierarchical oppositional structure; they are readily 
available even to non-specialists. In short, what Derrida seeks to establish is not an overturning 
of the hierarchy so that now the written word becomes the carrier of the “real” meaning. A 
superficial reading of Derrida’s écriture or “writing” may lead one to believe that this is what 
Derrida wants. But such an overturning would only invert the hierarchy, and this is not what 
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deconstruction or subversion is or should be about. Any overturning is doomed to fail, and 
Derrida himself has warned against such facile interpretations of his work on numerous 
occasions. Instead, Derrida’s point is that the dominant discourse has always taken this hierarchy 
for granted, and his subversion lies in showing that this hierarchy is indefensible, and only 
persists because of considerations other than philosophical ones. So Derrida is not merely 
highlighting the other side, but his emphasis on the “writing” side is strategic and in service of 
questioning the entire system. But of course he is also aware of the constant need to take a 
position. Hence the double bind, of which more later. In short, Derrida’s treatment of language, 
which continues throughout his entire work, seeks not so much to discredit one side of the 
hierarchy, but to complicate the hierarchy and the entire system itself. I would venture to say that 
this resonates with subversion to a large extent. If we recall the definition of subversion, Derrida 
is not trying to destroy one side of a binary system in favor of another side (although this is what 
he has often been accused of, especially by those who fail to see the whole picture); he is trying 
to overturn the entire system itself from within. 
 Now how does this apply to comparative philosophy or to Zhuangzi or Daoism? As we 
are all aware, one of the major problems of comparative philosophy is how to relate different 
experiences in different languages through translation. The translation problematics show a 
major danger, but also the possibility of a major contribution of comparative thinking towards a 
new understanding of philosophy. Translation has been recognized as one of the vital 
“institutions” of comparative thinking. As such, we could agree with Derrida that this institution 
is inevitable. It is never something we could escape. The real issue is not that we translate, but how 
we translate, and into what sort or kind of language. In the form of onto-theological metaphysics, 
no matter the language, philosophers have always spoken and written “in a certain manner, which 
is called philosophy, this manner of speaking and writing being of the most singular kind […]” 
(Derrida 2002a: 29, italics in original). Philosophy has thus come to be identified with a very 
particular discourse that is highly specialized and specific, and even within this philosophical 
language there are specializations that do not lend themselves easily to translations between 
themselves. “Within every language, European or not, what we call ‘philosophy’ must be linked 
regularly and differently, according to eras, places, schools, social and socio-institutional circles, 
to distinct procedures among which it is often difficult to translate” (Derrida 2002a: 29). One has 
merely to think of the gaping abyss between analytic and continental philosophy. The problem is 
really that each of those sub-disciplines with their own language considers themselves in many 
cases to be absolutely right, or at least they consider their own discourse to be the better way of 
thinking about things. But the realization that they are all just different ways of doing philosophy 
should warn us that there is not just one way of doing philosophy.  
 A common platitude is that since no translation is innocent, every translation means an 
interpretation. This interpretation however, says Derrida, “does not begin […] with what is 
commonly called translation. It begins as soon as a certain type of reading of the ‘original’ text is 
instituted ” (Derrida 2004: 19, italics added). What Derrida is trying to say here is not so much that 
we have to translate, but that as soon as a certain way of translation, favoring a certain way of 
thinking, becomes institutionalized, closure instead of opening takes place. And it is exactly this 
closure that Derrida wants to avoid, and with that I think he has made an important contribution 
to comparative philosophy. In this context Derrida will claim that “fidelity to the text” is actually 
displayed exactly by pointing to the text’s different emphases and possible readings. That is the 
only way to keep a text alive. Fidelity makes the text say as much as possible; it does not close it 
off in order to be possessed by the “real scholars.”  
 In Daoism there similarly are many instances where such openness and provisionality of 
language are spoken of. One example is chapter 32 of the Daodejing, where it is said that “When 
we start to regulate the world we introduce names.” It is acknowledged that this is an inevitability; 
however, “once names have been assigned, [w]e must also know when to stop. Knowing when 
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to stop is how to avoid danger” (Daodejing, Ames and Hall 2003: 127).20 Using language is 
inevitable, and it is inevitably arresting the flow and introducing hierarchies. Being aware of this 
has to do with knowing when to stop relying on this performative fixation; to remain open, we 
must use language carefully and under erasure to stop it from becoming dogmatic. Of course, 
this is corroborated in chapter 1, which tells us that “naming that can assign fixed reference to 
things is not really naming” (Daodejing, Ames and Hall 2003: 77). Such hesitance and a general 
attitude that understands the provisionality of language is prevalent in the DaoDeJing, as for 
example in chapter 56: “those who really understand it do not talk about it” (Daodejing, Ames and 
Hall 2003: 164), or in chapter 78: “appropriate language seems contradictory” (Daodejing, Ames 
and Hall 2003: 198). 
 In the Zhuangzi we find similar concerns. One thinks immediately of two instances in the 
Zhuangzi, the passage of the fish trap (chapter 26) and the passage of the goblet words (chapter 
27), both of which do not deny the necessity of using language, but warn against it becoming 
reified and substantialized. Instead, in both cases the authors of the Zhuangzi subvert that fixation 
without trying to step outside of the system of language per se. The fish trap story ends with the 
following: “Where can I find a man who has forgotten words, so I can have a word with him” 
(Zhuangzi, Watson 2003: 141).21 It is important that the Zhuangzi here does not advocate stepping 
outside of language completely; that would be the inversion of the opposition, which as 
mentioned before is exactly not what either Derrida or Zhuangzi are about. The passage says that 
after forgetting about words, we may finally speak with each other. Forget fixation, so we can 
discuss freely and provisionally. Similarly, the Goblet Words in chapter 27 empty themselves 
continuously to be filled anew, and anew. In this sense, with regards to language, subversion has 
the function of not closing us off, of not stopping to start beginning again and beginning yet 
again, to paraphrase another passage of the Zhuangzi. In short, Zhuangzi shares Derrida’s 
concerns over language, and also actively seeks to subvert dominant discourses by 
deconstructing their supposed superiority. 
 In concluding this section, I believe that both Derrida and Daoism (mainly in the 
Zhuangzi but also in the DaoDeJing) share a similar concern: that is, to subvert the claim to 
absolute correctness, to being right, in this case through their respective interpretations of 
language and its dangers and possibilities. And of course there are many other places in the 
Zhuangzi, including in the Inner Chapters, where this claim, I think, is confirmed. Whenever 
someone believes they are right, there is another viewpoint from where this is considered wrong. 
Something is always both “this” and “that.” Both Derrida and Zhuangzi point out, not just on 
the level of language, that there is always more to the story than meets the eye. One can never 
claim to be completely right because there is always an evolving context that will prove you 
wrong on another level. This should not reduce us to relativism, and neither to nihilism. It 
should make us aware of provisionality, but not incapacitate us. It should lead to intellectual 
humility, but not to inertia. How this is to be achieved will be discussed later. I now want to talk 
about that second institution of philosophy, the university. 
 
 
4 The University as the Institution of Philosophy 
 
The main reason I want to talk about how Derrida sees the university has to do with the 
foundation of reason. Of course, it would be hard to argue that Zhuangzi had any views on the 
institution of the university, since there was no such thing in his time as what we today 
understand as the university. But in its basic argument, I think Zhuangzi would agree with 
Derrida’s evaluation. Derrida understands the modern university as a thoroughly western 
institution largely based on the nineteenth-century model of the German university, which was 
itself a restructuring of the pre-enlightenment universities. This modern university has developed 
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into different departments, faculties, etc., all dealing in their own fashion with their own subjects. 
As its foundation or raison d’être, however, the university has the principle of reason. This 
overarching unifier, the principle of reason or rationality, is ideally embodied in (the faculty of) 
philosophy, and so philosophy has a priority status (that is, in the ideal situation, for this position 
of philosophy is, as we all know, far from being a reality). Yet, as Derrida explains, this principle 
of reason itself remains unquestioned, and thus arises for Derrida the question of what grounds 
the foundation. He concludes that “an event of foundation can never be comprehended merely 
within the logic that it founds […]. The origin of the principle of reason, which is also implicated 
in the origin of the university, is not rational” (Derrida 2004: 109). In short, we can appeal to the 
principle of reason, but there is nothing the principle of reason can appeal to. It cannot justify 
itself unless in circular fashion.  
 Derrida questions the structure of the university in the same fashion as that of language. 
Language is indispensable, but it is not neutral and is easily corrupted; it easily (and maybe even 
necessarily) becomes an instrument of a certain way of thinking instead of thinking in general. 
Language does not fulfill its promise of serving as a pure medium. It is, as the Chinese thinkers 
recognized long ago, a social construct rather than a pure reflection of reality. In the same way, 
Derrida argues that the university does not provide “unmediated” teaching or pure rationality. So 
many (philosophical and non-philosophical) influences increase the chances of the university not 
being able or willing to provide teaching of the widest possible range of philosophical thinking, 
because more often than not philosophy in the university limits itself to what mainstream 
western philosophers have considered it should be. And they have defended that position always 
by appealing to reason, without considering ways of thought that may be more interesting than 
their narrow definition of reason would allow.  
 This conclusion should lead us to the awareness that the university should acknowledge 
its position as an institution of knowledge. As we all know, institution means both a form of 
organization, as well as an established law or practice, as in “the institution of marriage.” This 
double meaning relates exactly to the tendency of an organization or structure to establish itself 
as correct and close itself off to novelty. Again, the debates around “marriage” and what it is 
supposed to be or not be form a good example here. In the context of the university, Derrida 
takes this to mean that as an institution it influences what work can be carried out in its name, 
and that means a certain responsibility of which I will say more shortly. This conclusion, at the 
same time, on a more practical level, means that the particular form of knowledge and Reason 
that has exemplified and identified western philosophy and thus western universities in general 
has institutionalized itself all over the world. The danger in this lies in the university closing itself 
off from different ways of knowing.  
 The university that recognizes its own non-rational foundational element would be less 
prone to shut itself off from the responsibility to open up its own rigid structures. Such a 
university would be a place where responsibility means responsiveness to different situations and 
to different times. That means a transformation of the teachings of philosophy (and other 
disciplines) in reaction to new objects of study and new or different ideas that come from 
outside the original university circle. In the proposals that Derrida wrote for the formation of 
such a new institution of thinking, the College International de Philosophie, we read that one of the 
major focuses of this new kind of thinking should be comparative. I quote at length: 
 
Most of all, this international openness must allow, in a more traditionally philosophical 
field, for the multiplication of original initiatives whose historical necessity is more 
obvious than ever today. We know that the “philosophical world,” assuming it still has a 
unity, is not only divided into “schools” and “doctrines” but also, beyond and 
independently of philosophical contents and positions, divided according to linguistico-
national borders that are more difficult to cross than political borders. These traditional 
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differences in “style,” “rhetoric,” “method,” and so on are sometimes more serious than 
differences in doctrine. Although they cannot be reduced to national languages and 
traditions, they nonetheless remain part of these. These philosophical areas between 
which passages are rare, whether in the form of critique or polemics, are a historical—and 
philosophical—challenge to philosophy (Derrida 2004: 215, italics added). 
 
Interestingly, in this quote, Derrida considers such differences and other ways of thinking mostly 
in terms of critique and polemics and challenge, although I think in the back of his head, as some 
of the other quotes in this paper show, he is really talking about complementarity. The double 
bind rests in criticizing certain hierarchical systems while remaining aware of the necessity to use 
such systems and transform them from within. The double bind also consists in the recognition 
that this is an ongoing process, and not a dialectical synthesis with a definable end product. 
 All of this entails that Derrida is acutely aware of the need to incorporate such thinking 
into the teaching of philosophy: “[d]econstruction […] has therefore in principle always 
concerned the apparatus and function of teaching in general, the apparatus and function of 
philosophy in particular and par excellence” (Derrida 2002a: 73). So what Derrida does is in 
principle and of necessity work on what philosophy has always considered secondary and of no 
real importance to the content and meaning of itself, that is, signifying structures in general and 
those influencing philosophical work in particular. Thus we can say that language, teaching, and 
institutions of knowledge (and therefore of power), such as the university, are exactly such 
signifying structures, and Derrida’s intention is in every case to show how they influence and to a 
great extent even determine what philosophy is.  
 Besides language and the university, Derrida has similarly questioned the institution of 
the press and the media in general, whose powers he also incessantly interrogates and holds to 
task. All the more imperative today, the powers of the press need both vigorous defending as 
well as relentless attacking—a defense of its task of rendering account and reason, an attack on 
its simplifications and abuses of power. Again, the idea of the double bind surfaces. 
 And the same goes for the almost unquestionable institution of the capitalist free market 
idea, which has become so dominant and ingrained that it is almost impossible to question. 
Again, Derrida questions these institutions not so much to deny them, or to deny them a place, 
but to deny them the dominance that they tend to display when power or too much power is 
congregated in them.  
 All this means that the double bind also consists in the realization that, for language and 
the university to open itself, for institutions to open themselves, for philosophy to be able and 
allowed to do so meaningfully, it must be recognized institutionally and given institutionalized 
space, at the same time as it tries to subvert such institutionalizations.  
 
 
5 Subverting Political Systems 
 
So how does all this relate to political systems and institutions? For Derrida, political systems are 
no different from the systems of language and philosophy; in fact they rest heavily on both these 
institutions. As such, as any institution, political systems must also be questioned and critiqued 
lest any of those systems becomes inflexible and pretends to be the only correct one. Derrida 
most frequently questions political systems by looking at their foundations. His aim is always to 
show how the foundations of any political system cannot be justified, in the same way he 
questioned the foundation of the origin of the university in the principle of reason, or the origin 
of meaning in language in the spoken word as opposed to the written sign. The origin is always 
without justification.  
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Since the origin of authority, the founding or grounding [la fondation ou le fondement], the 
positing of the law [loi] cannot by definition rest on anything but themselves, they are 
themselves a violence without ground [sans fondement] […]. They are neither illegal nor 
legal in their founding moment (Derrida 2002b: 242).22 
 
The realization of this undecidable moment in the foundation of law or a state (or by extension, 
any institution) should make us understand the subversive element in it: “The foundation of all 
states occurs in a situation that one can thus call revolutionary. It inaugurates a new law; it always 
does so in violence.” (Derrida 2002b: 269). Not just states that go through an actual revolution, 
but all states suffer from this inescapable fact. There is always an element of revolution and 
subversion in foundational movements. Only after some time is there an attempt to 
retrospectively and retroactively justify the foundation:  
 
A ‘successful’ revolution, the ‘successful’ foundation of a state […] will produce after the 
fact [apres coup] what it was destined in advance to produce, namely, proper interpretative 
models to read in return, to give sense, necessity and above all legitimacy to the violence 
that has produced, among others, the interpretative model in question, that is, the 
discourse of its self-legitimisation (Derrida 2002b: 270). 
 
In his own idiomatic way, these quotes and those from the previous sections show that what 
Derrida’s work amounts to is really the realization that one cannot claim to be completely right 
in any situation; the end station of justification is always absent or deferred. In fact, one could 
say that the end station is literally that, where justification ends. The overturning of a system is 
never merely to replace it with an opposing system. As we have seen in the language section, 
such overturning really remains parasitic to what it seeks to overturn. The justification for such 
new systems will always be either lacking or retrospective. Nevertheless, and here is where the 
double bind surfaces again, we do need political institutions, but as with the university, such 
institutions should be based on the realization of the provisionality and ultimate unjustifiability 
or undecidability of their own foundations. And this is where Derrida talks about un-decidability 
as the inability to purely follow a program, about the ultimately indefensible decision for justice, 
and about justice as non-deconstructible. For Derrida, this is how he seeks to avoid relativism. 
There are many competing theories out there, but none of them should be considered absolutely 
right. This does not lead to relativism, but it does lead to an intellectual humility where any 
decision is considered to be always provisional and open to question, relative to as many 
considerations as possible, without being systematically reducible to those considerations. One 
must decide based on an openness and not based on any system or established discourse. In the 
words of Saul Newman, Derrida’s “is a strategy of continually interrogating the self-proclaimed 
closure of this discourse. It does this by forcing it to account for the excess which always escapes, 
and thus jeopardizes this closure” (Newman 2001: 11, italics in original).23 
 
 
6 Zhuangzi 
 
We have encountered certain ideas found in the Zhuangzi throughout this paper, especially 
concerning language and in wider terms concerning the deconstruction of artificial and dominant 
structures. But actually, strangely enough, while Zhuangzi is best known for critiquing and 
subverting any artificial structure in view of promoting his particular form of acceptance of the 
way things are, for him such relentless questioning seems not to extend too far into the political 
realm. This may have various reasons. It may be because he thinks the Daoist sage should be 
above such worldly affairs, or it may be that he truly considers the political situation something 
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that is just the way it is. Either way, he accepts without question the position of the ruler versus 
the subjects, and is not really interested in revolution or political change. Any change in the 
external world should come from within, from an awareness of and aptitude in dealing with 
realities. If there is political critique in the Zhuangzi, it is not about any particular political situation 
or injustice; it is about the system of political rule per se. But even there Zhuangzi seems 
remarkably docile. The system is accepted as being there; it is how one deals with it, or 
alternatively escapes from it, that subsequently becomes important. 
 So on the one hand one can read in the Zhuangzi a definite duty to subvert man-made 
rules, since they are artificial attempts aimed at halting spontaneity. Examples abound of that: for 
instance, where Confucius is made to realize his limitations as one who “is the sort who roams 
within the guidelines” (Zhuangzi, Graham 2001: 89). Firmly kept within the guidelines of artificial 
structures, Confucius is unable to realize his full potential in spontaneity. Yet in practice we do 
not read a lot of subversion against the powers that be in the Zhuangzi. Instead, subversion seems 
either to be from within the person or to involve attempts to step outside of the system 
altogether. This is also attested to in the last of the Inner Chapters, in which the business of 
ruling is definitely looked down upon as unworthy of the Sage’s attention in most of the stories. 
And if ruling cannot be avoided, it should be done according to the Daoist precept of not ruling 
with assertive measures, but ruling by ziran 自然 and wuwei 無為, where the ruler attunes him- or 
herself to dao, which would then have the outward results flow naturally. So we see in the Daoist 
ruler according to Zhuangzi an example of the subversion of the standard traditional Confucian 
ideas of ideal rulers. The morality based on man-made rules, distinctions, and assertions is 
inferior to that inspired by tian 天 or nature, the former being considered a “bullying sort of 
power” (Zhuangzi, Graham 2001: 95). Yet again, seeing how the actual situation does not 
conform to the ideal, it seems that either the imperfect rulers should be obeyed, or one should 
retreat.   
 In chapter 4, Zhuangzi even advises against trying to persuade bad rulers, let alone 
revolting directly against them; so pragmatically he would be against demanding the right to 
question or subvert the dominant powers that be. He also insists quite strangely on the “duty” or 
“loyalty” to serve the ruler and obey (Zhuangzi, Graham 2001: 70). But at the same time there 
seems to be a “Daoist” way of trying to rectify the ruler in question. This Daoist way can take 
two forms: either escape duties altogether, and the Zhuangzi is replete with such behavior, or try 
to bend the system from within, and even in that case extreme care has to be taken not to upset 
the ruler. But it is in this “roaming free inside [the ruler’s] cage” (Zhuangzi, Graham 2001:69) that 
Zhuangzi’s ideas of subversion may be seen: changing the system from within, but in a Daoist 
way, and only when the audience, in this case the ruler, is receptive.  
 There may be another related reason why Zhuangzi seems reluctant to challenge 
authority. In a Daoist world, living out one’s life span and fulfilling one’s potencies are things 
sought after. Now it is not the case that Derrida may not have been concerned with such issues, 
but it is definitely not the thrust of his deconstructive work. Derrida struggles against a dominant 
metaphysical system and is in search of a way of thinking that may liberate (as far as possible) 
philosophy from this dominant system. Zhuangzi’s priorities lie elsewhere. In a philosophy that 
seeks to “mirror” nature and its processes, going against the ruler in uncertain times without 
recourse to laws and protection was of course dangerous. Hence practically Zhuangzi would only 
advocate such a thing if the ruler was actually receptive of the Daoist ideas. 
 On a more philosophical level, Zhuangzi in my opinion has a similar strategy to Derrida: 
while wanting to subvert the idea that “if you’re not with us, then you’re against us” through his 
relentless attacks on the narrow-mindedness of those who are stuck in any kind of oppositional 
viewpoint, he himself is weary of providing a new third viewpoint after subverting the possibility 
of sticking to “this” or “that.” In this, he is similar to Derrida. While there is never a really clear 
yes or no, at the very least we must defend the option of saying either yes or no, for if we do not 
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do that, we risk losing out to one-sidedness. So what makes Zhuangzi close to Derrida is that he 
is also acutely aware of the double bind involved in what he is trying to do. This is what Zhuangzi 
passages such as the following mean to me, as subversion of what knowledge is supposed to be: 
“to claim that there are such things as ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ before they come to be fully formed in 
someone’s mind in this way—that is like saying you left for Yue today and arrived there 
yesterday” (Zhuangzi, Ziporyn 2009: 11).24 One cannot claim to be unconditionally right without 
allowing at least that claim to be questioned from another viewpoint. This openness, which I 
discussed as a key feature in Derrida, is also found in Zhuangzi: 
 
You and I have been made to argue over alternatives, if it is you not I that wins, is it 
really you who are on to it, I who am not? If it is I not you that wins, is it really I who am 
on to it, you who are not? Is one of us on to it and the other of us not? Or are both of us 
on to it and both of us not? (Zhuangzi, Graham 2001: 60)  
 
Although Zhuangzi says we have been made to argue, and this is not the correct way to go about, 
at the very least this quote shows that he is open to questioning his own and other viewpoints. 
And here is a last quote to substantiate this: “What is It is also Other, what is Other is also It. 
There they say ‘That’s it, that’s not’ from one point of view, here we say ‘That’s it, that’s not’ 
from another point of view. Where neither It nor Other finds its opposite is called the axis of the 
Way” (Zhuangzi, Graham 2001: 53). From the perspective of Zhuangzi in this case, both 
viewpoints may be wrong, but the possibility of subverting one of them by pointing out its 
opposite in a complementary fashion is vital to understanding the provisionality of all viewpoints, 
because without such subversion, one viewpoint may start to consider itself as absolutely right; it 
will become preferred without question, institutionalized. What Derrida shares with Zhuangzi is 
the realization that subversion or the right to critique and question is thus only to be seen as a 
stage to be overcome, but it is nonetheless continuously a very necessary stage without which 
such overcoming would be impossible. It is in fact “letting both alternatives proceed” (Zhuangzi, 
Graham 2001: 54). And if one thinks of it in this way, the “overcoming” may never actually 
happen. Subversion may always be needed again and again. Subversion may “be” the 
overcoming in practice. Without the recognition of different standpoints, and without the option 
of questioning one standpoint from another standpoint, we may never move beyond standpoints 
altogether. And indeed there is an interpretation of Zhuangzi that argues that exactly this is his 
point: that whatever he may provide as another viewpoint, or even the attempt to escape 
viewpoints altogether, will by necessity have to be continuously subverted. It is the realization of 
this impossibility that is hinted at in his saying that “This is what is called ‘Letting both 
alternatives proceed’” (Zhuangzi, Graham 2001: 54). An openness to the other standpoint is 
crucial, whether one considers that standpoint to be right or wrong. It is important to remember 
that such openness does not mean we have to agree with a standpoint, and we have political 
equivalents in the western history of philosophy in the Voltairean principle of “I despise what 
you say, but will defend with my life your right to say it”25 and John Stuart Mill’s defense of 
liberty. Openness is necessary since the tendency of distinction making, of thinking in strict 
categories, is to claim completeness and/or hierarchy. In the Zhuangzi this is worded in the 
following way: “What goes on being hateful in dividing is that it makes the divisions into a 
completed set. The reason why the completion goes on being hateful is that it makes everything 
there is into a completed set” (Zhuangzi, Graham 2001: 103). This makes Zhuangzi close to 
Derrida’s continuous efforts to subvert closure. Completed sets by necessity close themselves off, 
and invariably create hierarchy. 
 For now, we may leave open the question of whether Zhuangzi’s end goal is a realization 
of the necessity of multiple standpoints, or an overcoming of them. There are arguments to be 
given for both of these goals, as there are with the idea of subversion in Derrida, but maybe that 
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is beside the point here. If anything, I have tried to show that their message really is that any 
such overcoming will most likely need to be overcome itself in a continuous process, but one 
that does not see itself as dialectical. But if this is indeed an important similarity between them, 
then we must also point to an important difference: Zhuangzi ultimately wants the Daoist adept 
to be naturally reflective (think of the mirror images often used in Daoism) without deliberating 
too much about alternatives, and this is where there is a difference with Derrida. For although 
Derrida’s “decision” is to a certain extent unprogrammed, he nevertheless insists that a lot of 
deliberation needs to be done before such a decision is made. The decision should, however, 
never be reducible to such deliberation. Zhuangzi, on the other hand, seems to want to get rid of 
the step of deliberation altogether, and jump to the conclusion straightaway, intuitively. But even 
then, as the story of cook Ding in the Inner Chapters and many others in the outer chapters 
show, such a jump can never be made completely without deliberation and without training in 
such matters as the decision would be about. The woodworker Qing in chapter 19 can make the 
bell-stand he makes only because he is trained. He is not a novice who just decides on a whim to 
go and make a bell-stand. He is a trained professional who nevertheless cannot be reduced to 
this training and the following of a program. The same obviously goes for cook Ding in chapter 
3. Although the actions of these Daoist exemplars seem to flow effortlessly, such actions are 
actually the result of years of practice and training. But in the end, neither cook Ding nor 
woodworker Qing can be confined to this training; rather, they have perfected their arts to go 
beyond deliberation and training. This means that this particular difference between Derrida and 
Zhuangzi may in hindsight not be as great as initially perceived. 
 There is another important practical difference that has been mentioned before. What we 
have in Zhuangzi is a double injunction: on the one hand, Zhuangzi never ceases to criticize and 
try to subvert the moral institutions and institutionalization of morality; on the other, and unlike 
Derrida, he does not actually question the institution of the state itself.26 But perhaps Zhuangzi 
can help us realize something important here: subversion or critique need not do such a thing 
anyway. It need not be anarchist. It only needs to disagree with how the state is currently 
organized. However, one cannot escape a sense of paradox here in Zhuangzi. On the one hand, 
one must serve the ruler with utmost loyalty, but one must do so while being non-engaged 
mentally or even physically. I think this is what is meant with the aforementioned phrase, 
“roaming free in the cage.” On the other hand, Zhuangzi advocates staying away from the whole 
business of politics as far as possible. Stay away if you can, and if not, play the game without 
actual involvement.  
 If this is a paradox, then we must also remember that Zhuangzi is not really one to be 
bothered by paradoxes anyway. And much of the paradox evaporates if we consider two 
important things. First, Zhuangzi is aware that he cannot have his cake and eat it. So he is really 
talking about two different situations, the ideal one and the actual one. In the ideal state, a Daoist 
ruler would not actually be doing anything assertive anyway, and the kind of non-commitment 
that he is talking about would fit right in. Think about the notions of ziran 自然 and wuwei 無為 
again. In chapter 7 of the Zhuangzi, it is said that to rule with regulations, standards, judgements, 
and measures derived from exemplarity is “sham Virtuosity. To rule the world in this way is like 
trying to carve a river out of the ocean, or asking a mosquito to carry a mountain on its back” 
(Zhuangzi, Ziporyn 2009: 50). Ruling in any assertive way is discredited, and nothing is really put 
in to replace it in any practical way. The Daoist ruler does not really rule, or rather rules by not 
assertively ruling. Anyone who has to actively participate in government is already doing 
something artificial, which in the ideal situation would not be needed in the first place.27 
 Second, there is the actual situation. Here Zhuangzi is aware of its shortcomings and 
pessimistic of change, so he advises to not get drawn in. Stay useless. But we may ask if this 
emphasis on uselessness in chapter 4 might not rather be seen as a passive form of subversion or 
critique—a principled refusal to be drawn into unjust governments when the prospect of actual 
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change is seen as impossible to achieve? A refusal to be useful for such governments? The 
refusal to take office indicates scorn both for the possibility of a good assertive government and 
for the actual government in place at the time. But in the end, are not Zhuangzi’s true or genuine 
persons “the sort that roam beyond the guidelines”? (Zhuangzi, Graham 2001: 89). Do they not 
perceive themselves as those to whom the (Confucian dominant) rules do not seem to apply at 
all?  
 Can we not say then that critique and subversion are things that are normally engaged in 
on the level of disputation, of knowledge, of right and wrong, and Zhuangzi does indeed engage 
in it somewhat on this level, but that on a deeper level the real Daoist would subvert the entire 
system exactly by standing above or outside of these concerns? Is this not what the notions of 
ziran and wuwei seek to convey? Here indeed lies a big practical difference with Derrida. Because 
Derrida denies such deeper levels, he would most likely consider Zhuangzi a reactionary figure 
for not getting involved. We certainly know that Derrida felt the need to be drawn in, and he 
actively participated in public life, constantly subverting and complicating certain views within 
the public sphere, in the good left-wing French intellectual tradition (while also being critical of 
some elements of that tradition itself). Examples abound of larger and smaller public issues 
where Derrida actively took a stand, and he was also instrumental in a political sense in education 
policies. 28  We may of course point to the vast differences in time, culture, and political 
circumstances to explain this, but it nevertheless seems that Zhuangzi is saying one should stay 
true to dao 道, or to one’s de 德 and xin 心, and not be persuaded to play along or critique directly 
on a practical level. Of course, the notions of ziran and wuwei can be understood in this fashion, 
as staying away from artificiality in all its forms and living a life of direct responsiveness and 
natural morality. This would be the alternative, where we understand Zhuangzi as advocating a 
“deeper” level of subversion by stepping away from it all, even in a kind of mystical-retreat 
fashion, as also exemplified in the Autumn Floods chapter. 
 But then again Zhuangzi would not be Zhuangzi if he did not complicate this “final” 
retreat itself, as there is also a different understanding of notions such as ziran and wuwei. I 
contend that Zhuangzi thinks of those who have stepped away from it all as missing one final 
step, for lack of a better phrase: the return to society in a different mindset. In the Inner 
Chapters Zhuangzi often seems to start endorsing a dichotomy, such as the one between what is 
of man and what is of tian, but then invariably complicates that dichotomy and especially the 
hierarchy involved in it. In chapter 1 for example, Zhuangzi seems to endorse a definite 
hierarchy between the “little” and “great” understanding. The bird Peng is better than the little 
ones, Song Rongzi and Liezi are better than normal men, but yet they still need to “depend” on 
something else, so they are still making distinctions. This whole distinction-making and the 
ensuing hierarchy is then questioned in chapter 2 as being still based on one-sidedness and 
oppositional thought. In our context, to claim that it is “right” to retreat and not get involved 
would still be parasitic on the dichotomy of right and wrong, and it is exactly that dichotomy that 
Zhuangzi tries to subvert in his final move in chapter 2:  
 
Where there is recognition of right there must be recognition of wrong; where there is 
recognition of wrong there must be recognition of right. Therefore the sage does not 
proceed in such a way, but illuminates all in the light of Heaven […]. A state in which 
‘this’ and ‘that’ no longer find their opposites is called the hinge of the Way. When the 
hinge is fitted into the socket, it can respond endlessly (Zhuangzi, Watson 2003: 35).  
 
 Chapter 6 also exemplifies this complication and argues that the “true or genuine persons 
of old” had not rested content with being tian-like only, but knew how to strike a balance 
between what is man-made and what is of tian. And although Derrida of course has no 
dichotomy between tian and man to deal with, we could say that there are striking similarities 
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between both their realizations: both recognize that one cannot step outside of the system 
altogether, and that one should continuously be involved in subverting it from the inside. 
 So the perceived differences between Derrida and Zhuangzi seem largely practical, and 
less so when considered philosophically. On a philosophical level, both Derrida and Zhuangzi 
have been accused of being amoral. But that indictment would only hold force from within the 
systems they are indirectly trying to step outside of. They indeed do not try to give us new sets of 
rules. If that is considered amoral, then the accusation is right. Yet surely the whole point of 
attempting to step outside the system of conventions, of pointing to the conventionality of the 
rules, of subverting the entire political and moral narrative seems indeed to be aimed at changing 
things from the inside nonetheless. Although their strategy is not to propose an alternative 
narrative but to subvert the possibility of such alternatives, we may legitimately ask what comes 
after such a subversion of the possibility of alternatives for both Zhuangzi and Derrida? What 
are their answers? 
 
7 Solutions? 
 
Two solutions may be offered based on my assessment. Neither of them solves anything. My 
paper in that sense also reflects an undecidability. The first solution, and one can find this in 
both Derrida and Zhuangzi, argues that we should not seek to provide a new narrative that 
overcomes all other narratives, but that we should rest in the subversion or be aware of the 
necessity to subvert any attempt at a new narrative. This solution thus argues that there is no 
solution, that this is human reality and should be embraced exactly in its impossibility and 
paradoxicality. This is what Derrida calls the double bind. Subversion is not meant to do away 
with narratives, but to complicate them and thereby to keep in check the tendency of (dominant) 
narratives to close off other ways of thought. Subversion then, although it may itself be extreme, 
in yin yang fashion is meant to stop us from drifting to extremes. It provides constant checks and 
balances that should cause us to act with a certain intellectual humility. 
 The other solution would argue that this process is somehow going to bring us beyond 
the level of such narratives. Again, in both Derrida and Zhuangzi one can find elements of this 
way of thought. The Daoist sage would seem to embody this solution, and in Derrida this takes 
the form of the non-deconstructible or the undecidable, which means an ultimately unjustifiable 
decision to take a stand in full awareness of its unjustifiable status, for justification would remain 
on the level of that which can be deconstructed. This solution thus lies in realizing the 
impossibility of final answers, but also and nonetheless in deciding for now in favor of one answer 
in awareness of its provisionality. 
 Can both solutions be correct? Is neither correct? Is there a third party that can 
adjudicate? Somewhere Derrida says: “A foundation is a promise” (Derrida 2002b: 272). 
Subversion entails the promise of a new foundation. Without that promise, it has no justification 
and no legitimacy. But the foundation itself is exactly without justification, as Derrida has shown. 
This is the aporia that I believe neither Derrida nor Zhuangzi try to solve. Both are happy to stay 
with the ultimate violence, indefensibility, and “decision” character (meaning non-programmable) 
of their so-called “solutions.” “Justice is an experience of the impossible” (Derrida 2002b: 244), 
Derrida says. In Zhuangzi’s words: “The torch of chaos and doubt, this is what the sage steers by” 
(Zhuangzi, Watson 2003: 38).  
 In the words of Hans-Georg Moeller, Daoism seeks to go back to “a premoral state in 
which people act harmoniously self-so (ziran) without a need for ethical instructions and 
prescriptions” (Moeller 2007:  48).29 But is that the real goal? Neither the DaoDeJing nor the 
Zhuangzi are able to give a rational defense of this premoral state other than claiming that non-
distinction-making leads to a naturally good society. Ultimately this foundation is just as much 
without justification as it is in Derrida, and Zhuangzi is of course aware that such an ideal world 
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is unrealistic. Zhuangzi’s “true or genuine persons of old” supposedly were premoral in the sense 
that they lived in a mythical age before distinctions were introduced, yet they are also said to be 
those “in whom neither Heaven nor man is victor over the other” (Graham 2001: 85). And it is 
exactly this ability to practice wuwei and ziran in this imperfect world that makes them “true or 
genuine.” So Zhuangzi wavers between a pure premoral state (recognizing this to be impossible 
to attain) and the ability to be ziran and wuwei in this world, which he believes one could attain. 
 Philosophy then, in the world of Derrida and Zhuangzi, is indeed a Pharmakon, both cure 
and poison. It should poison and corrupt the youth, at least if that means that they are constantly 
exposed to critique and different viewpoints, curing them of believing a single narrative, or at 
least of seeing their own narrative as infallible. 
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